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Editors' Note: The following is Professor
Harrison's response to Professor Evelyn
Pluhar's article "Arguing Away Suffering:
The Neo-Cartesian Revival," which appeared
in the preceding number of Between the
Species. Professor Pluhar's reply follows.
Several corrections of errors, for which the
editors are responsible, are to be made to
"Arguing Away Suffering." See ''Errata'' on
page 92 of this number.

the practice of nailing research animals to boards for
vivisection without benefit of anaesthesia." The
implication is that from assumed facts about animaIsthat tlley do not feel pain, for example---certain moral
consequences directly follow. However, to arrive at
conclusions about how animals ought to be treated, we
must be anned with more than facts. l Some moral theory
must come into play. Indeed one's view of morality will
determine which facts are morally relevant. For those
who subscribe to some crude form of utilitarianism,
according to which tlle morality of acts is judged by
whetller tlley conduce overall to physical pleasures or
pains, putative facts about animal pain may well be tlle
sole determinant of how animals ought to be treated. It
might follow, for such utilitarians, that if animals do
not feel pain, tllen there are no strictures on how they
may be treated. However, for those who, like myself,
subscribe to an alternative moral theory, animal pain is
but one element among others. In my view there ,are
moral considerations independent of the vexed question
of animal pain which ought to govern our treatment of
nonhumans. Thus, even if animals do not feel pain, it
does not directly follow for those committed to some
nonconsequentialist theory of ethics that we can treat
animals how we wish. 2
The fact that the question of animal pain and the
moral status ofanimals are distinct issues can be further
illustrated by reference to the treatment of animals in

Let me begin by saying that I am grateful to
Professor Pluhar for having drawn my attention to some
possible sources of confusion in my original paper and
for pointing out where further clarification is required.
In view of space limitations I will not deal with all of
her criticisms seriatim but will consider major points
of contention under five headings:
I. The Moral Implications of Animal Pain
2. Mental States and the Relevance of Physical
Similarities
3. Sensation and Consciousness
4. Free Will and Determinism
5. The Relevance of Evolutionary Theory
'This will be followed by some general remarks about
my overall argument. I will not be restating my original
case in any detail, but given that it is not presented in
its best light in the preceding article, readers may wish
to consult it for tllemselves.
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1. The Moral Implications of Animal Pain

PHILOSOPHY

Perhaps the most serious misconception in Professor
PIuhar's paper is her contention that if Peter Carruthers
and I have our way, "scientists might as well return to
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dualism which differ from the classical formulation of
Descartes.s "Dualists" in this context are simply those
who consider propositions about mental states to differ
from propositions about physical states in terms of both
meaning and reference. Admittedly, dualism, Cartesian
or otherwise, does have difficulties, but in my view these
are less intractable than those of alternative theories of
mind. In any case, arguments that animals are not
subjects of such mental states as pain do not necessarily
rely upon a dualist theory of mind. As Pluhar herself
indicates, earlier this century it was actually opponents
of dualism who, influenced by linguistic philosophy,
challenged the meaningfulness of all mentalistic
statements. In view of this confusion it might be worth
sorting out some of the implications of various theories
of mind, particularly with respect to the argument from
physiological similarities.
It seems to me that the most a dualist can say is that
under specific conditions, certain neurological
structures seem necessary for mental events of certain
kinds. 6 (I mearrempirically necessary, not logically
necessary.) To make the much more difficult case that
the same neurological structures are sufficient for mental
experiences, we need to subscribe to some theory of
mind according to which, in principle, all propositions
about mental events are logically deducible, or
empirically discoverable, from propositions about
physical states. 7 A materialistic theory of mind,
according to which mental states are nothing but
physical states of the brain, would be most suitable.
However, even if some form of physicalism is correct,
and if, through some unimaginable scientific
breakthrough, we are able to infer mental states from
physical states, it may still tum out that the subjective
experience of pain in one human individual may turn
out to be represented by a different physical state from
that which obtains in another human being experiencing
pain. Thus no amount of knowledge of brain states
would ever shed light on mental states. But further, even
granting all of these "ifs," we would never be in a
position to know what an animal's mental states were,
because despite the most complete knowledge of their
physical states, given that their nervous systems differ
from ours in significant ways, and given that we have
no independent access to their mental states (assuming
they have them), we would have no way of constructing
the hypothetical map which would allow us to read off
mental state from physical state. Thus even the theory
of mind which most favours the view that the similarity

the seventeenth century. It is by no means clear, however
frequently it may be asserted, that Descartes "had a
profound effect on the practice of vivisection," The
sources offered for this common view, if any are offered
at all, are usually those contemporary French writers
who describe the gruesome experiments carried out by
the Cartesians at Port-Royal. 3 However there are equally
compelling counter-instances of Cartesians who
preached kindness to animals. 4 Moreover, for this
argument to work, it would have to be shown that
Cartesians pursued animal experimentation with more
vigour and cruelty than did their non-Cartesian
counterparts. To my knowledge, no one has established
this. Indeed it would be surprising if they could, for in
the seventeenth century it was simply not necessary to
go to the extent of denying that animals felt pain in
order to justify experimenting on them. Whether
animals felt pain or not was irrelevant, given the almost
universal belief that animals had been placed in the
world for the service of mankind. It was this view,
combined with the Baconian understanding of nature,
which informed the practice of vivisection. Only with
the advent of Bentham's utilitarianism did the purported
capacity of animals to feel pain become morally
significant. Again, it is clear that one's treatment of
animals need not be determined solely, if at all, by
whether they are capable of feeling pain.
2. Mental States and
the Relevance of Physical Similarities

We now tum to my apparent covert commitment to
Cartesian dualism. This is ascribed to me on the basis
of examples put forward to show that pain is a mental
state (a claim which, I confess, could have been stated
more explicitly, but which should not be confused with
another which Professor Pluhar erroneously attributes
to me, that pain is "primarily psychological," whatever
that means). There are few, if any, philosophers who
would contest this assertion. What is at issue is the
relation between such mentalistic statements as "I am
in pain" and physicalistic statements of the kind "X's
nervous system is presently in such and such a physical
state." My position with respect to the relation of the
mental and the physical is indeed dualist, but one may
be a dualist without subscribing to Descartes' ontology
of dual substances. Leibniz isa case in point, and some
would argue that epiphenomalists are dualists of a kind.
There are, in addition, a number of modem versions of
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thought to correlate with those states. Either way, the
use of such tenns sheds no light on the mental lives of
nonhumans and is at best highly equivocal, at worst,
hopelessly mUddled.
The whole body of "respectable evidence" to the
effect that animals make "choices," incidentally, is
predicated upon a similar linguistic confusion.9
In the light of this discussion, we can return to what
prompted the charge of Cartesian dualism-my
discussion of the psychology of pain. Reference was
made to this literature to illustrate one simple principle:
if two human individuals, who presumably have very
similar neural structures, experience the same painful
stimulus in different ways, the subjective experience
ofpain is simply not a direct function of neuroanatomy.
(Aristotle, Spinoza and Ryle, incidentally, would hardly
have supported my general position. Ryle, in particular,
was a notorious anti-dualist. These philosophers were
cited merely to show there is general agreement that
pain is not a sensation.)
To conclude this discussion of the relevance of
physical affinities, let me make it clear that I do not
deny the significance of "the neurophysiological
similarity of human and nonhuman species." This
similarity, however, can admit of two quite distinct
interpretations. I welcome Pluhar's announcement that
we have 98.4% of genetic material in common with
chimpanzees (although the statistic is somewhat
misleading).l0 We can add to this the observation of
Sir John Eccles that "in the [human] neocortex no
special structural or physiological properties have been
identified that distinguish sharply a human brain from
the brain of an anthropoid ape."ll What these
similarities demonstrate is that the achievements of
human consciousness are vastly disproportionate to
the neurological differences which exist between
ourselves and our nearest relatives. We do not
characteristically observe our simian cousins
producing works of art, writing literature, composing
music, or building cities, which are, on average, 98.4%
as good as ours. There is in the animal world nothing
to compare with the products of the conscious mind,
however much evolutionary biologists want to stress
the continuities between human and animal species.
(Chimpanzees' constructions of two- and three-term
expressions in ASL do not, in my view, compare
favourably with the works of Shakespeare.)l 2 Nor need
we be committed to any particular theory of mind to
see the force of this disproportion. We may, like

of animals' neural structures to our own is a relevant
consideration in detennining whether they feel pain,
must be supplemented with additional assumptions.
When we turn to those psychologists whose research
apparently involves "the induction of grief, anxiety,
anguish and psycho~is in nonhumans," the relevance
of our discussion of alternative views of mind becomes
apparent. It is clear that some materialistic theory of
mind is often tacitly, and hence uncritically, accepted
by the scientific fraternity. Symptomatic of its influence
is an increasing tendency in psychology to convert
mental criteria into physical criteria. Physical criteria
can be measured and manipulated in a way that mental
criteria cannot, and physical criteria yield "objective"
knowledge. A classic case is the treatment of dreaming
in psychological literature. The sole criterion for the
occurrence of a dream is a waking report. However,
some psychologists, attempting to establish links
between measurable physical states and reports of
dreams, have tended to displace the mental criterion in
favour of some physical criterion, in this case, a period
of rapid eye movement (REM). But as Nonnan
Malcolm has ably demonstrated, however interesting
the correlations between these physical events and
subjects' reports of dreams, such connexions can only
be established by continual reference to the original,
mental criterion of dreaming. s The illicit substitution
of "period of REM sleep" for "dream" leads psychologists into a discussion of some phenomenon which
only indirectly pertains to what we routinely refer to as
"dreaming." The criterion of "dreaming" as we
commonly use the tenn, is emphatically not some
measurable physiological state, however convenient this
latter characterisation might be for psychologists.
In animal psychology the tendency to make these
kinds of illicit substitutions is endemic. Hence, as
Pluhar has indicated, we find such labels as "grief,"
"anxiety," "anguish," and "psychosis" applied to
animals. However, the criteria for the use of these
tenns are not, as in the case of human use, reports of
mental state but, rather, particular physical syndromes
which correspond roughly to those physical states of
human beings who make reports of the psychological
phenomena concerned. These subtle substitutions can
only be meaningful if their reference is restricted to
those physical characteristics which serve as criteria
for their application or if the standard use of the terms
as applied to humans is altered so that these tenns refer
not to mental states but to other physical criteria
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On its own, the behavioural evidence is
ambiguous, since persistence of a response
after the stimulus has ended, memory,
anticipation and learning are readily explained
in terms of simple neural mechanisms which
do not require the postUlation of any form of
subjective experience on the part of the
animal. I5

Descartes, postulate the existence of some spiritual
substance which, allied to the human brain, accounts
for the difference. Alternatively, we may want to argue
that the unique products of human culture are direct
functions of very small brain differences. But even if
we adopt this second view, we are admitting that the
relevant statistic is not 98.4% similarity, but the 1.6%
difference. There simply is no proportionality between
physical and mental worlds.

4. Free WiD and Determinism
3. Sensation and Consciousness
To holding "the undefended assumption that the
capacity to choose is incompatible with the deterministic
thesis," I plead guilty. I also concede that the classic
problem faced by incompatibilists, like myself, is "how
to construe an uncaused choice in a meaningful way."
The classic counter is, of course, that free agents are
the causes of their own actions. The problem of freedom
and determinism, like the mind-body problem, is not
one which I claim to have solved. All I have done is to
opt for a philosophically-defensible thesis of human
freedom which is consistent with my overall position.I 6
For the benefit of those who, with Professor Pluhar,
believe that an action can be both determined and freely
chosen, let me rephrase the argument which links pain
and choice: If animal behaviour is externally caused
(i.e., not caused by animals acting as agents), then we
have some good reasons for thinking that animals do
not suffer pain. Despite Pluhar's claim to the contrary,
this is not an instance of attempting to prove a thesis by
appealing to its premisesP The only genuine ground
for complaint is the "if' used in the formulation of this
argument. If Pluhar can show that my view of free-will
is wrong, then the argument fails. But while
incompatibilism of the kind outlined above continues
to be a serious philosophical option (although, as I
conceded in the original paper, not an uncontroversial
one), my case remains plausible.

In the final section of my paper I am alleged to
have made a "stunning turn," conceding that
nonhumans can experience pain. At least I am in
illustrious company, for Descartes and I stand jointly
charged with wanting to have it both ways, in that we
are supposed to have asserted both that animals are
not conscious and that they are capable of having
sensations. The difficulty here is that words like
"sensation" carry with them what Wittgenstein called
"grammatical illusions"-in this case the belief that
all sensation is conscious. (We have already witnessed
this in the parallel instances of animal "anxiety,"
"grief," etc.) As Descartes himself was at pains to point
out, albeit in vain, sensations need not be conscious. I3
Animals, in his view, have sensations, but they are
not aware of them. There is no ambiguity here, it is
simply a matter of attending closely to how these
words are used. (Leibniz's "apperception" was an
attempt to avoid the misunderstanding engendered by
the use of "sensation.")14 The point I am making, at
any rate, is not, as Pluhar erroneously believes, that
animals experience genuine pains and then forget them
but, rather, that animals lack the self-conscious identity
which is a prerequisite for conscious experience. The
sentence which is cited in support of my stunning
turn-"I am not implying here that painful experiences
which are forgotten were never painful to start with"refers only to human experience, as should be clear
from the original context.
Pluhar has placed a similarly unfortunate construction on my argument concerning learning in
Protozoa. My observations about Protozoan habituation
were to illustrate the principle that learning does not
require consciousness, not that all learning was of the
simple Protozoan kind. Rather than multiply examples
beyond necessity, let me simply cite another author on
this question:
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5. The Relevance of Evolutionary Theory
Professor Pluhar is quite justified in chastising me
for having given a rather simple account of natural
selection. Indeed, my own case assumes the more
sophisticated version which she presents. Yes, it is true
that not every trait of every species confers some kind
of selective advantage. Accordingly, when Pluhar states
that it is "simply false to say that debilitating pain,
depression, anxiety, etc., do not threaten our survival,"
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I am in full agreement with her. My point is that the
human species has something which compensates for
this-namely, a culture which insulates us from
selection pressures which might otherwise lead to our
demise. Culture enables us to "carry" these, and perhaps
other, negative traits.. It seems less likely that animals,
who do not enjoy the benefit of this cultural buffer, would
be able to perpetuate similar disadvantageous traits.
It must also be pointed out that while evolutionary
theory might in principle allow for the fact that some
traits confer no selective advantage, it is not clear, in
practice, when evolutionary biologists would be
justified in abandoning the search for such explanations,
for a researcher could never be in a position to
distinguish between a trait which conferred an as yet
unknown selective advantage, and one which was
simply not advantageous. We can see the strength of
this if we consider the example provided by Pluharthe behaviour of a cat or dog which ceases to eat on the
death of a companion. It might reasonably be argued
that one half of a superannuated breeding pair is no
longer in a position to enhance the survival of the
species. On the contrary, having fulfilled its
reproductive function, it is now competing for food
resources with other pairs which have reproductive
potential. Not eating in this situation turns out to be
advantageous to the species. Now, it does not really
matter whether this account works or not. The point is
that such behaviour is not intrinsically "mysterious" to
those who deny that animals have subjective states
analogous to human grief, because there will always
be the possibility of some such overlooked explanation.
Professor Pluhar might respond at this juncture with
the cry of "false dilemma." This "grieving" behaviour,
she might point out, is both adaptive and indicative of
mental grief. Rather than trump the false dilemma with
Occam's razor, let me just point out that to introduce
mentalistic explanations is immediately to move beyond
the bounds of evolutionary theory, for it is behaviours,
not mental stites, which adapt, and it is only physical
entities which can be the subjects of natural selection.

hasty generalisations, but the remarks about the
"inadequately supported statements" and the "questionbegging assumptions" are revealing. On the first head,
there were, indeed, a number of inadequately supported
statements in my piece. This does not mean that they
are insupportable. My views on the nature of free will,
for example, were not supported, but the running in
this department has been made by others. The same
applies to my assumptions about the nature of mind.
The important thing in these cases is that arguments
are available. Moreover, in the construction of a
plausible argument-which is all I have claimed for
my case-it is perfectly legitimate to make assumptions,
provided that they are not clearly false. A critic must
show that such assumptions are erroneous, not merely
contentious. While Professor Pluhar has competently
rehearsed some standard objections to a number of my
assumptions, she has not shown any of them to be false.
On the second head, Pluhar seems to confuse the
demonstration of the consistency of a position with
begging the question. My argument functions in part
by showing that if we take a certain position with respect
to (say) free will, and add to this a commitment to a
particular philosophy of mind, we may be led to certain
remarkable conclusions about animal consciousness.
These, in tum, may mesh neatly with a certain type of
theodicy. The fact that these positions are mutually
supportive actually strengthens the argument. It follows
that an effective criticism would have to demonstrate
that (a) my premises are false, or (b) the implications I
have drawn from those premises are false, or (c) the
various philosophical positions which serve as my
premises are inconsistent with each other. Professor
Pluhar has failed on each of these counts.
Notes
I This not least because, as Hume famously pointed out,
no "ought" is deducible from an "is."

2 Philosophers as divergent as Aquinas and Kant denied
the relevance of animal pain, while insisting at the same time
that we ought to refrain from cruelty to animals. More recently,
some writers on animal welfare have avoided references to
pain in the search for more objective criteria to inform the
treatment of animals. See, e.g., D.M. Broom, "Indicators of
Poor Welfare," British Veterinary Joumal142 (1986) 524f.
For a brief statement ·of the kinds of moral considerations
which I consider to be relevant to our treatment of nonhuman
animals, see Peter Harrison, "Do Animals Feel Pain? ,"
Philosophy 66 (1991) 25-40, part v; cf. Patrick Bateson,

Conclusion
To conclude, I wish to offer some brief comments
on Pluhar's final verdict on my argument. In her
judgement, it consists of "a series of inadequately
supported statements, hasty generalisations, and
question-begging assumptions." I'm not sure about the
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"Assessment of Pain in Animals," Animal Behaviour 42
(1991) 827-39, p. 836.

heuristic value of such expressions with their truth. Of course,
some might wish to argue that, for example, measures of
"stress" (qua physical phenomenon) should inform our
treatment of animals. This is fine as far as it goes, but such
arguments could not be justified by the further claim that
"stress" is an index of pain.

The utilitarian approach, in any case, suffers from other
embarrassments. While there is doubt about animals'
subjective experiences of pain, there must be doubt about how
they ought to be treated. Moreover, utilitarianism leads to a
conflict of positive duties toward animals: Do we save the
bird from the cat? For a systematic account of the limitations
of a utilitarian approach to the issue, and of some of the
implications of a contractualist ethics, see Peter Camithers,
The Animals Issue: Moral Theory in Prcu:tice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1992).

10 A significant amount of our DNA seems to play no
active role in genetic specification.

II John Eccles, The Hwnan Mystery (Berlin: Springer,
1979), p. 234.
12 It is not entirely clear to me why Pluhar has taken my
ironic reference to chimpanzees and ASL as some kind of
shameful admission. I can only assume that she has
misunderstood the language criterion for consciousness. At
this point, the only claim I will make for language use is that
it is a dramatic example of the discontinuity between humans
and other animals.

3 The standard sources are Joseph Lavalk, Letters of a
Marmeluke (London, 1804), p. 106; N. Trublet, Memoirs pour
selVir d I' histoire de la vie et des ouvrages de M. de Fontenelle
(Amsterdam: Mrac-Michel Rey, 1761), p. US. Nicholas

Fontaine also wrote of Cartesians who justified vivisection
by claiming that animals did not feel pain: see L. Rosenfield,
From Beast-Mcu:hine to Man-Mcu:hine, (New York: Octagon,
1968), p. 54.

13 See Peter Harrison, "Descartes on Animals," The
Philosophical Quarlerly 42 (1992) 219-27. Peter Carruthers

makes the same point with his notion of "nonconscious
experience."

See, e.g., John Norris, Essay Towards the Theory ofthe
Ideal or Intelligible World (London: Pr. for S. Manship, 1704),
pp. 59,100. Also Louis Racine, cited in Rosenfield, BeastMcu:hine to Man-Machine, p. 53.
4

14 Leibniz, incidentally, for a time a least, shared Descartes'
views about animal consciousness. Discourse on Metaphysics,
XXXN, tr. George Montgomery (Chicago: Open Court, 1902);
cf. Correspondence with Arnauld, in Ibid., pp. 156, 220.

5 For some modem versions of dualism, see The Case
For Dualism, ed. J. Smythies and 1. Beloff (Charlottesville:

University Press of Virginia, 1989).

15 Patrick Bateson,

6 Even

this may be doubtful. We would generally say, for
example, that a striate cortex is necessary for conscious visual
experiences. However, some human individuals seem to be
able to see without one. See David Paterson, "Is Your Brain
Really Necessary?," World Medicine 3, May, 1980,21-4. The
argument that certain neural structures are at least sufficient
for certain conscious experiences would, in any case, only
apply to human mental states. The brains of birds, for example,
also lack a striate cortex, despite behaviour which suggests
that they have visual experiences. I should add that some
dualists believe in the possibility of disembodied existence.
Under these conditions, obviously no physical state would
be a necessary condition of a mental state.

"Assessment ofPain in Animals," 834.

16 The standard defence of self-determinism was provided
by Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (New
York: Garland, 1977). For a more recent discussion see Agency
and Necessity, ed. A. Flew and G. Vesey (Oxford: Blackwell,
1987).

17 Pluhar makes this complaint because she confuses the
logical relations which obtain between three distinct
propositions: (I)X is a machine, (2) X cannot feel pain, (3)The
behaviour of X is externally determined. On these relations
see John Cottingham, .. 'A Brute to the Brutes?': Descartes'
Treatment of Animals," Philosophy 53 (1971) 551-61.

7 Epiphenomenalists would also accept this, but in my
view the position of epiphenomenalism is neutral with respect
to arguments about animals' consciousness.
8 See Norman Malcolm, Dreaming (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1959), ch. 13.
<} I should point out that I do not deny the heuristic value
of these locutions. For many reasons, both practical and
scientific, it might be helpful to speak of animals as if they
were subjects of mental states. But we ought not confuse the
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